CHICAGO (Legal Newsline) – An embattled provider of online payday loans who allegedly used his standing as a member of a Sioux Indian tribe to tailor loan agreement terms to skirt state and federal law will need to defend yet more of those loans in federal court after the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel determined arbitration procedures designed to give jurisdiction over the contracts to tribal courts failed to pass legal muster.
In a 42-page opinion issued Friday, more than a year after arguments were heard, the federal appeals panel reversed U.S. District Judge Charles P. Kocoras’ July 2012 decision to dismiss the suit three Illinois residents brought against lender Martin A. Webb and a collection of his payday loan companies.
Judge Kenneth F. Ripple wrote the opinion, in which Judge Ilana Diamond Rovner and U.S. District Judge Sarah Evans Barker concurred. Barker, of the Southern District of Indiana, sat on the panel by designation.
The Seventh Circuit panel found Kocoras had erred in dismissing the matter based on a clause within the loan agreements stipulating disputes between the lender and borrower be settled under arbitration procedures established by tribal courts within the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, whose reservation is located in South Dakota.
The panel said this clause is unenforceable under federal and Illinois law as the tribal government lacks the legal rules, policies and mechanisms needed to actually arbitrate the dispute, making the arbitration provision in the agreements “unreasonable” and “unconscionable” to the borrowers.
“With respect to substantive unconscionability, the dispute-resolution mechanism set forth in the loan agreements – ‘conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by an authorized representative in accordance with its consumer dispute rules’ – did not exist,” Ripple wrote for the panel
As such, “there simply was no prospect ‘of a meaningful and fairly conducted arbitration;’ instead this aspect of the loan agreements ‘was a sham and an illusion,’” Ripple added, citing language from a lower court ruling.
The panel’s opinion stems from the suit plaintiffs Deborah Jackson, Linda Gonnella and James Binkowski, all of Illinois, brought in 2011 in Cook County Circuit Court. It was later removed to Chicago’s federal court.
All three borrowed $2,525 from Western Sky Financial LLC, an online payday loan business operated by Webb as part of a family of such payday loan processing companies collectively known in court filings as the Webb Entities.
They filed a class action against Webb and his businesses, alleging the loans, which included interest rates as high as 139 percent, violated federal and state lending laws.
The suit is just one of several legal problems Webb is dealing with.
Western Sky and his other companies face a federal racketeering class action suit and he agreed to pay almost $1 million in fines as part of a settlement with the Federal Trade Commission over a regulatory action accusing them of engaging in “unfair and deceptive tactics to collect on payday loans.”
Those actions are separate from the suit brought by Jackson, Gonnella and Binkowski.
In response to the Jackson suit, Webb, who is a member of the Cheyenne River tribe, persuaded Kocoras to initially dismiss the matter based on an arbitration provision in the loan agreements, a move that handed jurisdiction over disputes to Cheyenne River tribal courts.
Following oral arguments before the Seventh Circuit in January 2013, the panel issued a limited remand to the federal court for a determination on whether the tribal courts could actually oversee such arbitration.
Kocoras determined they could not, noting a number of difficulties, including potential arbitrator bias, a lack of arbitration experience and knowledge among tribal officers and a lack of clear rules pertaining to arbitration in consumer loan disputes.
In reversing the lower court’s dismissal and remanding the matter for further proceedings, the appeals panel cited those findings and said the suit never should have been dismissed because the arbitration provision in the agreements is “illusory.”
“The arbitration clause here is void not simply because of a strong possibility of arbitrator bias, but because it provides that a decision is to be made under a process that is a sham from stem to stern,” Ripple wrote for the panel.
The appeals judges also determined the tribal courts, under federal law, likely lacked jurisdiction to decide consumer finance matters involving the plaintiffs and similar matters involving citizens who are not members of the Cheyenne River tribe.
In one of our cases, Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC, No. 12-2617, 2014 WL 4116804 (7th Cir., August 22, 2014), the federal court of appeals in Chicago rejected an attempt by payday lenders associated with a Native American tribe to avoid state restrictions on such loans. The court held that the district court erred in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ lawsuit, alleging that certain loans promulgated by defendants that had yearly interest rates of 139 percent violated various Illinois civil and criminal statutes, where dismissal was based on venue clause contained in loan agreements that called for parties to submit disputes to arbitration conducted by Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe that were to take place on Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservation located in South Dakota. The court found that the arbitral mechanism specified in loan agreement was sham/illusory, since Tribe had no procedures for selection of arbitrators or for conduct of arbitral proceedings. Thus, it would not have been possible for plaintiffs to have ascertained dispute resolution process and rules to which they were agreeing at time of loan agreement. As such, Ct. found that plaintiffs could proceed in federal court where venue clause in loan agreement was substantively and procedurally unconscionable.
The following is from a comment about the case on Indigenous Law and Policy Center Blog Michigan State University College of Law:
As should be expected by this time, payday lending in Indian country is creating bad law for tribal interests. This case involved a privately owned payday lending operation. Tribally-owned operations will be scrambling to distinguish themselves from this case. Particularly troublesome is the holding and (hopefully) dicta from the opinion that suggests tribal courts have no jurisdiction involving off-reservation lending operations, even though the operation is based in Indian country and even though the lending instrument includes a forum selection clause naming a tribal forum.
My initial recommendations to tribal leaders and counsel — shut down on-reservation-based payday lending operations operated privately immediately. My second recommendation is to ensure that tribal regulations of tribally owned payday lending operations are independent and robust. In other words, tribes must be able to withstand the kind of searching inquiry into their regulatory scheme that the federal court did in this case. Can tribal sovereign lenders say that?
The Federal Trade Commission has joined the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in filing an amicus brief in the matter of Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham, P.C before the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The case concerns the interpretation and enforcement of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).
The FDCPA provides that “a debt collector” must send a consumer a notice containing important information about the consumer’s debt and rights either in “the initial communication” or “[w]ithin five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt.” Consumers have 30 days after receiving such a notice to dispute the debt and to request information about the original creditor.
The FTC, joining the CFPB, argues in the brief that each debt collector that contacts a consumer — not just the first debt collector that attempts to collect a particular debt — must send a notice that complies with this provision. The brief therefore concludes that the Circuit Court should reverse the District Court’s prior ruling granting summary judgment to the ARM firm in the case.
The Commission vote authorizing filing of the joint amicus brief was 5-0. It was filed on August 20, 2014.
Debt collector gets 27 years in scams, threats that targeted elderly
Article by: JOY POWELL
August 20, 2014 – 7:22 PM
A crooked debt collector was sentenced Wednesday to 27½ years in federal prison for stealing clients’ money and identities and going so far with intimidation that he threatened to push a disabled veteran in a wheelchair off a bridge.
Khemall Jokhoo, 36, formerly of Lonsdale, Minn., and Burnsville, was sentenced in U.S. District Court in Minneapolis on 33 counts after trying to steal more than $700,000 by using identities of more than 60 victims. He targeted the elderly.
A jury trial found that Jokhoo was formerly registered as a debt collector and was the owner and sole employee of First Financial Services, which he ran from a Burnsville apartment, from May 9, 2002, through Nov. 3, 2009.
As a debt collector, Jokhoo, who has lived in several metro communities, had access to customers’ sensitive credit information, including dates of birth, addresses and more.
“Jokhoo used this information to harass and intimidate victims and to demand payment to him for purported debts,” the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Minneapolis said in a statement Wednesday. “When he could not convince victims to pay him, Jokhoo impersonated victims, using their bank accounts and other identifying information to take over and steal directly from their account.”
In addition to using intimidation tactics, Jokhoo threatened victims with physical harm if they did not pay him, including the disabled veteran in the wheelchair.
U.S. Attorney Andrew Luger said identity theft is a widespread problem, and local and federal law enforcement agencies joined to stop Jokhoo — and to prevent additional victims.
“The term ‘identity theft’ seems an inadequate description for what the defendant did to the victims in this case,” said Assistant U.S. Attorney Lola Velazquez-Aguilu.
“He used their identifying information not only to steal their money but also to terrorize them, taking pleasure in making other human beings feel completely powerless and without worth. This defendant’s sentence sends an important message to debt collectors who use their positions of trust to steal.”
She and fellow prosecutor LeeAnn Bell tried Jokhoo, leading to convictions for 11 counts of bank fraud, 10 counts of aggravated identity theft, nine counts of mail fraud, two counts of wire fraud and one count of impersonating an officer or federal employee.
U.S. District Judge David Doty said after 175 months in federal prison, Jokhoo will be on five years of supervised release. Doty also ordered Jokhoo to pay more than $257,000 in restitution, according to a spokesman for federal prosecutors.
The Minnesota Financial Crimes Task Force, state commerce department, U.S. Postal Service and Lonsdale police investigated.
State commerce officials had stripped Khemall “Kenny” Jokhoo of his debt collection and real estate licenses and fined him and his company $100,000 in May 2011.
An administrative law judge had found earlier that Jokhoo misrepresented himself as a lawyer, harassed debtors over extremely old, uncollectable accounts, made unauthorized withdrawals from debtors’ financial institutions, cashed forged checks and concealed a prior criminal record on at least seven state license applications since 2005.
If you have a car with an ignition shutoff and the seller/ finance company has activated it, please contact us.
Lenders continue to offer subprime automobile loans aggressively to consumers with imperfect credit.
“Don’t let bad credit stop you from getting a new car!” a voice actor exclaims in one television ad, as images of shiny sport utility vehicles appear onscreen. “At 450Credit.com, a 450 credit score, plus $450 a week in income, equals a brand-new car!”
Advances in technology could explain why lenders continue to offer subprime car loans. While the loans are still risky, these technologies have made the process of repossessing vehicles cheaper and easier, minimizing potential losses on soured loans.
For example, massive databases can now track the location of license plates so that lenders can quickly snatch up cars on which their owners have missed multiple payments. The past decade has also seen the proliferation of in-car devices that some lenders use to locate vehicles and lock ignitions when their customers miss payments.
Taken together, the technologies improve the chances that auto lenders will recover their collateral.
Repo men now are equipped with cameras that read the license plates on parked cars and compare them to lists of vehicles. The photos get matched with GPS data and fed into a searchable database. Then auto lenders can marry that data with information from other sources in order to get a rich understanding of their customers’ daily habits.
Privacy advocates are raising concerns about how technology has changed the repossession industry. But there’s no question that cameras have simplified the process of retrieving cars. Rather than knocking on neighbors’ doors to track down delinquent borrowers, repo men can often go straight to locations where the vehicle has been seen recently.
Today, auto lenders are finding additional uses for these databases earlier in the lending process. For example, when a borrower fills out a loan application, the address he provides can be cross-checked with a license-plate database and other sources, in order to determine whether he is actually living at the address listed.
Even if lenders have reason to believe a borrower is lying, some will still make the loan, according to Jackson. That’s because the lender knows where to find the car, and the borrower doesn’t know that the lender knows.
And there are other technologies that are further changing the risk calculus for auto lenders.
In deep-subprime lending, which Experian defines as loans to borrowers with credit scores below 550, cars often come loaded with devices that use GPS technology to track the vehicle’s movement, as well as ignition locks that can be activated remotely if the borrower misses payments.
These devices are controversial, with some drivers reporting that they’ve found themselves stranded in the middle of an intersection after the ignition was locked.
From the lender’s standpoint, an ignition lock can act as a powerful motivator for a borrower to pay. The devices also make the repossession process easier.
What some lenders ignore is the fact that the activation of such a device constitutes a repossession under the Uniform Commercial Code, triggering notice requirements.
If you have a car with an ignition shutoff and the seller/ finance company has activated it, please contact us.
Among banks, 4% of auto loans made in the first quarter were classified as deep-subprime, and another 14% were subprime, according to Experian. Those percentages were far higher among buy-here pay-here dealers and auto finance companies.
CFPB Issues Bulletin to Prevent Runarounds in Mortgage Servicing Transfers
Bureau Highlights Risks in Transferring Loans Under Loss Mitigation Review
Washington, D.C. – Today, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is releasing a bulletin outlining expectations for mortgage servicers that transfer loans. The bulletin includes information on how mortgage servicers should pay special attention to new rules protecting consumers applying for loss mitigation help or trial modifications.
“At every step of the process to transfer the servicing of mortgage loans, the two companies involved must put in appropriate efforts to ensure no harm to consumers. This means ahead of the transfer, during the transfer, and after the transfer,” said CFPB Director Richard Cordray. “We will not tolerate consumers getting the runaround when mortgage servicers transfer loans.”
Mortgage servicers are responsible for collecting payments from mortgage borrowers on behalf of loan owners. They also typically handle customer service, escrow accounts, collections, loan modifications, and foreclosures. Generally, borrowers have no say in choosing their mortgage servicers. Servicing transfers among servicers are common and may occur in several ways. The mortgage owner may sell the rights to service the loan. In some case the owner of the loan may hire a sub-servicer rather than servicing the loan itself.
In January 2014, the CFPB’s new common-sense mortgage servicing rules took effect. The rules protect mortgage borrowers from runarounds by their servicers. Servicers are now required, for example, to maintain accurate records, promptly credit payments, and correct errors on request. Among other things, the new regulations also require servicers to maintain policies and procedures to facilitate the handover of information when a servicer transfers a loan to a new company.
Today’s bulletin gives examples of some things CFPB examiners will look for when loans are transferred. In particular, CFPB examiners will carefully scrutinize transfers of loans with pending loss mitigation applications or approved trial and permanent modification plans. Examples of good practices by servicers include flagging those loans and taking special care to ensure that all relevant documents are transferred in a timely manner.
If servicers are not fulfilling their obligations under the law, the CFPB will take appropriate actions to address these violations and seek all appropriate corrective measures, including remediation to harmed consumers.
Throughout 2013 and 2014, the CFPB has been working to ensure a smooth industry transition to compliance with the new mortgage servicing rules. The Bureau maintains a Regulatory Implementation website, which consolidates all of the new mortgage rules and related implementation materials and resources, at:http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulatory-implementation
New York Law Journal article about one of our cases:
Secondary Debt Collectors Must Give Notice, Judge Says
Mark Hamblett0 8/18/2014
The fair Debt Collection Practices Act requires subsequent debt collectors to notify consumers in writing, even if the prior holder or debt collector had already given notice, a federal judge has ruled.
Deciding an issue that has divided courts, Southern District Judge William Pauley III ( See Profile) said secondary collectors still must send a validation notice to avoid confusion by consumers over who holds the debt and whether they have the right to contest it.
In Tocco v. Real Time Resolutions, 14-cv-810, Pauley said the requirement of a validation notice in 15 U.S.C. §1692g “applies to initial communications from each successive debt collector.”
Under §1692g, once a debt collector has initially contacted the consumer, it must send, within five days, a notice stating the amount of the debt, the name of the creditor and a statement that the debt will be assumed valid if the consumer does not dispute it within 30 days of receiving it.
If any portion of the debt is disputed, the collector has to send verification of the debt to the consumer as well as a statement that, at the consumer’s written request, the collector will send the name and address of the original creditor if it is different from the current creditor.
Plaintiff Angelique Tocco filed a putative class action in the Southern District in 2014 against Real Time Resolutions, a debt collector that sent her a form letter on July 31, 2013 informing her that the servicing of her mortgage had been transferred to Real Time.
Tocco’s complaint alleged that the form letter failed to disclose the current owner of the debt and lacked the required notice of dispute.
Tocco also alleged that a second letter she received on Oct. 1, 2013, one that advised her of options to resolve her past due account, did not disclose the amount of the debt, identify the creditor, or inform her of her right to dispute the debt.
Real Time made an offer of judgment for $1,100 plus reasonable costs and attorney fees, but Tocco rejected it.
Real Time then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing before Pauley that neither the July 31 nor the Oct. 1 letters were “initial communications” under the FDCPA because Tocco had already engaged in litigation over the same debt with the Real Time’s predecessor-in-interest, Solace Financial.
Pauley, noting a division among courts that have considered the issue, rejected that argument in an opinion issued Wednesday.
“Reading the text broadly to effect the FDCPA’s consumer-protective purpose, this court holds that a debt collector must send a validation notice under section 1692(a) even if a prior debt collector already sent a notice regarding the same debt,” he said. “This interpretation is consistent with the recommendations of the Federal Trade Commission and forecloses some confusion a consumer might experience when faced with a successive debt collector.”
As an example, Pauley said, “a consumer who has challenged an initial debt collector to verify a debt may not realize she has the same right with respect to a subsequent collector.”
Real Time also contended that the July letter did not require FDCPA notice because it was already required to give notice under another law—the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.
The company said its July 31 letter was informational only and did not explicitly demand payment, and therefore falls outside the FDCPA’s notice requirements for any communications “in connection with the collection of any debt.”
Pauley said, “Several courts have embraced this distinction between informational letters and attempting to collect a debt,” but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has yet to weigh in. Pauley read the statute differently from the courts that have made the distinction.
“The fact that a letter may have been a required informational notice under a separate statute does not prevent it from being an initial communication ‘in connection with the collection of [a] debt’ under the FDCPA,” he said. “‘In connection with’ is synonymous with the phrases ‘related to,’ ‘associated with,’ and ‘with respect to.'”
The phrase is “expansive,” he said. “And it is broad enough to encompass a letter identifying a new debt collector, providing an address for future payments and warning ‘[t]his is an attempt to collect on a debt and any information obtained will be used for that purpose.'”
Real Time had argued that reading the requirements that broadly would bring every communication between a debt collector and a debtor under the act. Pauley disagreed.
“[I]t is not burdensome for a debt collector contacting a debtor in ‘an attempt to collect a debt’ to, at least that first time, include the full set of section 1692 notices or follow up with them in five days,” he said. “To do otherwise risks confusing the debtor.”
Pauley also resolved another question that has split the courts on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which permits a defendant to “serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specific terms.”
Under the rule, a plaintiffs claim is rendered moot when an offer of judgment exceeds what the plaintiff could recover.
Pauley said neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has addressed the effect a Rule 68 offer has before a court has had the opportunity to resolve a motion for class certification under Rule 23, but some courts have held that Rule 68 cannot be enforced prior to a decision on certification because it would allow defendants to “pick off” individual name plaintiffs until the certification decision is made by a different, perhaps more favorable judge.
Here, he said, Tocco asked permission to file for certification, and Pauley treated the request as a motion for such.
“If a Rule 68 offer made before a plaintiff had a reasonable time to move for class certification would not moot a claim, then by extension a Rule 68 offer made after the plaintiff has moved for class certification should not do so,” he wrote.
Abraham Kleinman, of Kleinman LLC in Uniondale and Tiffany Nicole Hardy of Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin in Chicago represent the plaintiffs.
Kleinman said Thursday the judge got it right.
“The original Tocco case versus Solace Financial—that was a case that listed Lehman Brothers as the current creditor and, at that date, Lehman Brothers was defunct, it was gone,” he said. “So who owns this lady’s mortgage?”
Geoffrey Garrett Young and Casey Devin Laffey of Reed Smith represented the defendants.
There is an article in today’s New York Times Magazine, “Paper Boys–Inside the Dark World of Debt Collections,” which underscores why a consumer should never, ever just assume that someone attempting to collect a debt from them is entitled to do so, even if they purport to have information about the debt.
“As long as paper continues to be stolen, double-sold or otherwise exchanged without accurate supporting information — like statements or copies of the original signed contracts — consumers will be exploited and collectors like Siegel and Wilson will have to fend for themselves.”
“As he soon discovered, after creditors sell off unpaid debts, those debts enter a financial netherworld where strange things can happen. A gamut of players — including debt buyers, collectors, brokers, street hustlers and criminals — all work together, and against one another, to recoup every penny on every dollar. In this often-lawless marketplace, large portfolios of debt — usually in the form of spreadsheets holding debtors’ names, contact information and balances — are bought, sold and sometimes simply stolen.”
“Later, he also became a debt broker or dealer, a type of role he knew quite well: “I used to buy pounds of weed, all right, and then break it down and sell ounces to the other guys, who were then breaking it down and selling dime bags on the corner, right? Well, that’s what [I’m] doing in debt.” …“I buy old crap,” Wilson said. “I’m the King of Crap.”
“It was part of a much larger package of roughly $50 million worth of debt, which he bought for just 12 basis points — or one-twelfth of a penny on the dollar. It had been bad paper, Owens said, and he’d gotten burned on the deal. After the purchase, Owens discovered that another agency was collecting on the same paper and, what’s more, that some of the dates on the debts had been manipulated so that the paper appeared newer than it actually was. As Owens saw it, when buying from debt brokers, this was all part of the risk you faced. He concluded: “It is just data you are purchasing.”
“The [Consumer Financial Protection] bureau vowed to police the nation’s largest 175 agencies, but one recent projection on the industry estimates that there will be 8,501 debt-collection firms in 2015 in the United States. And the companies engaging in the most grievous behavior — like falsely threatening lawsuits or collecting on bad paper — tend to be the smaller operators. It inevitably falls upon the state attorneys general to go after them, which means depending on overburdened officials like Karen Davis.”
Note that the mere fact that a debt collector has information about you or about the debt does not establish that it in fact has any right to collect.
If the information in your credit report is not accurate, a lender or credit card company could say that you qualify, but for a high interest rate when in fact you may actually qualify for a lower rate. In some cases inaccuracies could even lead lenders to turn you down entirely.
The Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) promotes the accuracy, fairness and privacy of information about consumers in the files of credit reporting agencies. One right consumers have is tochallenge the accuracy of the information contained in their credit file. Under the FCRA, both the credit reporting company and the information provider (that is, the person, company or organization that provides information about you to a consumer credit reporting company) are responsible for correcting inaccurate or incomplete information in your report. To take full advantage of your rights under this law, LaShawn Brown, Extension Educator with Michigan State University Extension suggests you contact the credit reporting company and the information provider. Brown says, “You do not need to hire someone to fix your credit report.”
If you identify information in your file that is incomplete or inaccurate and report it to the consumer credit reporting agency, the credit reporting company must investigate the items in question — usually within 30 days — unless they consider your dispute frivolous. Tell the creditor or other information provider, in writing, that you dispute an item. Include copies (NOT originals) of documents that support your position. Keep copies of everything you submit.
In February 2014, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) reported that consumers now have an option to provide supporting documents such as a paid bill, a letter written explaining the issue, a police report or proof of identity information, or other correspondence when you submit a dispute to Experian, TransUnion or Equifax. You can upload, mail or fax any supporting documents you have to explain the errors in your credit report.
The CFPB states that the credit reporting companies must forward your dispute, including all relevant information, to the information provider. If the information provider corrects your information
When the investigation is complete, the credit reporting company must give you a short written response and describe the results which include how your report has changed. If an item is changed or deleted, the credit reporting company cannot put the disputed information back in your file unless the information provider verifies that it is accurate and complete. The response provided by the credit reporting company must also include notice that says you can request a description of the procedure used to determine the accuracy and completeness of the information, including the business name, address and phone number of the information provider.
From the August 9, 2014 New York Times, editorial pages:
Dealers who can offload loans to banks before the loans fail take the same rapacious approach that mortgage lenders took in the run-up to the recession. They prey on less sophisticated borrowers, falsifying the borrower’s income information and writing loans with astronomical interest rates and hidden fees that deliver a quick profit to the dealers.
One of the more egregious tactics is the “yo-yo,” in which the buyer drives away believing that the deal has been closed, only to be summoned back days or weeks later and told that original deal has fallen through and that he or she must either surrender the car or accept a higher interest rate and terms that are much less advantageous. Borrowers who desperately need cars to get to work or to convey ailing parents back and forth to the doctor often feel that they have no choice and end up signing on the dotted line.
Our consumer protection, collection abuse and class action law firm, attorneys and lawyers represent clients throughout Illinois and Wisconsin including, but not limited to Chicago, Elgin, Aurora, Schaumburg, Naperville, Bolingbrook, Joliet, Plainfield, Barrington Hills, Waukegan, Winnetka, Evanston, DeKalb, Geneva, Batavia, Wheaton, Woodridge, Rockford, Harvey, Markham, Westchester, Cicero, Berwyn, Belvidere, West Chicago, Country Club Hills, Crestwood, Rolling Meadows, Romeoville, Chicago Heights, Tinley Park, Orland Park, Oak Forest, Homewood, Lansing, Calumet City, Hazel Crest, Dolton, Riverdale, Midlothian, Frankfurt, Oak Lawn, Oak Park, Cook County, DuPage County, Kane County, Will County, McHenry County, Lake County and more.